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INTRODUCTION 
When Minnesota created the first sentencing commission in 1978 
and the first sentencing guidelines in 1980, it was hard to predict 
where the guidelines movement would go.  More than three decades 
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and twenty sentencing guideline regimes later,1 it is still not easy to 
foresee what will become of sentencing commissions and guidelines.  
The past decade alone has witnessed tremendous changes in sentenc-
ing law and policy that were hard to imagine even just a few years be-
fore they occurred.  The Supreme Court’s landmark sentencing 
decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey,2 Blakely v. Washington,3 and United 
States v. Booker,4 the reform of federal crack cocaine laws, and a finan-
cial crisis that has sparked significant sentencing reforms have all been 
monumental and, to some extent, unexpected developments. These 
seismic shifts will undoubtedly alter the landscape going forward in 
similarly unpredictable ways. 
As this Symposium looks to the future and what it holds for sen-
tencing guidelines, it is important to proceed with caution and a 
healthy dose of modesty.  None of us really knows what will happen.  
But one helpful way to approach the future is to reflect on some of 
the key lessons we have learned in the more than thirty years with 
sentencing commissions and guidelines.  There have been consistent 
themes and struggles, and there is no reason to believe these core is-
sues will dissipate going forward.  In this Article, I highlight these 
struggles and analyze how they can productively guide the future of 
sentencing guidelines.   
Although I divide this Article into four different topics, they are 
united under one umbrella:  the tension that arises from the fact that 
sentencing commissions must produce guidelines that are simultane-
 
1 See Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power:  The Politi-
cal Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973, 1994 
tbl.1 (2006) (listing eighteen guideline regimes as of publication in June 2006).   
Alabama’s guidelines became effective in the fall of 2006, and the District of Columbia 
has guidelines as well.  See Act of Apr. 5, 2006, No. 312, § 2, 2006 Ala. Acts 663, 663 
(codified at ALA. CODE § 12-25-34.1 (2006)); D.C. SENTENCING & CRIMINAL CODE REVI-
SION COMM’N, VOLUNTARY SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2011), available at 
http://acs.dc.gov/acs/frames.asp?doc=/acs/lib/acs/pdf/2011_Voluntary_Sentencing_
Guidelines_Manual.pdf. 
2 See 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to re-
move from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of pen-
alties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. . . . [S]uch facts must be established 
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” (first alteration in original) (quoting Jones v. 
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 
3 See 542 U.S. 296, 304-05 (2004) (holding a 90-month sentence invalid under the 
Sixth Amendment where the sentencing scheme required the judge to make additional 
factual findings beyond the jury verdict to impose that sentence). 
4 See 543 U.S. 220, 237 (2005) (applying Blakely’s Sixth Amendment analysis to Fed-
eral Guidelines cases). 
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ously reflective of the best empirical and expert knowledge about sen-
tencing and acceptable to political overseers.  The battle between ex-
pertise and politics is a familiar one for all administrative agencies, but 
it is particularly fraught for sentencing commissions.  This is because 
the politics of crime is, in William Stuntz’s memorable phrasing, 
“pathological,”5 and because the expertise involved is less scientific—
or at least appears to be less scientific—than in other regulatory fields.6  
Striking the proper balance between these often-competing forces 
must be the central mission of every sentencing commission as it crafts 
guidelines.  This Article’s central inquiry is how commissions manage 
the tension between expertise and politics given what we know about 
commissions and guidelines. 
Part I begins by considering a topic that provides common ground 
for both experts and politicians:  data.  Guidelines are at their best and 
most effective when they are based on sound empirical data and pro-
fessional expertise.  Achieving that outcome often requires commis-
sions to consider what empirical information most influences political 
actors.  Whether the data represent the fiscal impact of proposed sen-
tencing laws or the effect of sentencing laws on different populations, 
empirical information has had a profound impact on sentencing law 
and policy and will undoubtedly continue to do so.   
Part II turns to a related empirical question:  the relationship be-
tween race and sentencing guidelines.  A concern with racial dispari-
ties was a driving force of the guidelines movement, and it is thus a 
topic of political importance.  Yet we remain uncertain today whether 
guidelines have eased or exacerbated racial disparities.  Sentencing 
commissions can no longer stand on the sidelines of this question.  
While commissions cannot make policy calls about what to do with the 
racial disparities in the criminal justice system, they are ideally placed 
to study sentencing patterns and practices to better understand the 
relationship between sentencing guidelines, their enforcement, and 
the racial composition of the prison population.  It should be the goal 
of every sentencing commission to use its expertise to arm elected rep-
resentatives with as much data as possible on the question of race and 
criminal justice so those officials can make decisions informed by facts, 
not assumptions or inaccurate impressions.  
 
5 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 
(2001). 
6 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 734-35 (2005) 
(explaining why legislators might view sentencing as more accessible than more tech-
nical fields of regulation). 
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While Parts I and II focus on the ways in which expertise and poli-
tics can come together, Part III confronts the question of what com-
missions should do when there is a conflict between politics and 
expertise in crafting guidelines.  Commissions must adapt to the polit-
ical environment in which they operate to achieve real-world change.  
But commissions should not let politics override the agency’s expert 
mission unless the agency’s political overseers demand it and no other 
viable options present themselves.  The relationship between guide-
lines and mandatory minimums offers an example of this dynamic.  
Mandatory minimums are often set by legislatures based on political 
factors that conflict with a commission’s expert judgment about how 
best to set guidelines.  This Part argues that guidelines should stay true 
to expert assessments and that mandatory minimums should trump 
the guidelines only in cases in which the mandatory minimums are 
expressly applicable.  An entire system of guidelines should not be de-
termined by legislative judgments that are contrary to sentencing exper-
tise unless the legislative body makes it clear that it desires this outcome.  
Commissions must respond to political will, but that does not mean 
that they should compromise their professional judgments unless the 
legislature directly commands them to do so.   
Part IV concludes by exploring important limits on what guide-
lines can accomplish.  If we have learned anything from the past that 
can inform our future expectations, it is that there are limits to what 
guidelines can do, even when they are based on the best empirical in-
formation available.  Guidelines must strike the difficult balance be-
tween individualization and uniformity.  Ultimately, it is critical to 
recognize that no amount of expertise can fully resolve this tension.  
Guidelines will never be perfect and comprehensive, and there will 
always need to be some play in the joints.   
Guidelines have been limited in another way:  they govern judges, 
and sometimes parole officials, but they do not address prosecutorial 
discretion.  To be sure, commissions could and should do more to ad-
dress the relationship between guidelines and prosecutorial power.  
But here too there are limits to what a commission can accomplish 
with guidelines, even when armed with all the data in the world.  Be-
cause some amount of prosecutorial discretion is necessary and inevi-
table, guidelines must account for that reality.   
Finally, it is important for commissions and guidelines not to ne-
glect an often forgotten actor in the criminal justice system:  the jury.  
The jury is the quintessential foil to a model based on expertise, as it is 
comprised of lay people with no specialized knowledge of crime or 
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punishment.  Yet it is important to remember that at the heart of any 
criminal justice system are questions of morality and justice that are 
not amenable to charts and data but rather are suited for juries com-
prised of members of the community.  Commissions must be attuned 
to the jury’s role as well.  
I.  DATA 
Although political judgment and expert opinion often conflict, in 
the sentencing guidelines context they come together through data.  
Many kinds of data might reflect expert knowledge, yet only certain 
types of data have currency in political debates over crime.  Infor-
mation on the costs of proposed sentencing reforms is the most effec-
tive data sentencing commissions can produce to obtain legislative 
approval of guidelines.  
Nearly every state with a sentencing commission has made a cost 
projection system a central part of its mission.  Minnesota’s demon-
strated success in pioneering and using fiscal forecasting to maximize 
the effectiveness of the state’s limited resources has led other states to 
follow suit.7  These state sentencing commissions and their respective 
legislatures value cost projection data because the data allow them to 
allocate efficiently their limited crime-fighting resources to establish-
ing guidelines.8  State legislators have frequently modified proposed 
laws in light of expert forecasting by a state sentencing commission.  
Sometimes states increase sentences in light of cost data, knowing that 
they can afford the expense.  Other times, states decrease sentences 
for some crimes, often nonviolent crimes, to prioritize scarce prison 
resources for violent crimes and to reduce crime at a lesser cost.  The 
data thus assist elected officials no matter what their policy goals.  
 
7 See Letter from the Ctr. on the Admin. of Criminal Law, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, to 
the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 3 (Aug. 29, 2008), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ 
ecm_dlv3/groups/public/@nyu_law_website__centers__center_on_administration_of_
criminal_law/documents/documents/ecm_pro_058383.pdf (noting that “virtually every 
sentencing commission has followed” Minnesota’s sentencing commission model, 
which included cost projections in its mandate). 
8 See Barkow, supra note 6, at 809 (noting that “[a]lmost every state to adopt a 
guideline system since the middle of the 1980s has opted to require some version of an 
impact statement” and that these cost estimates have “proven to be effective in cutting 
costs by slowing incarceration rates and prison overcrowding”); Letter from the Ctr. on 
the Admin. of Criminal Law, supra note 7, at 3 (arguing that cost projections allow 
lawmakers to “[a]chieve a more rational and effective criminal justice system that max-
imizes . . . crime reduction benefits from . . . criminal justice expenditures”). 
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States that have used these forecasts to maximize their resources 
have not experienced an increase in crime rates.  Indeed, during the 
last twenty years—the period over which most states have made use of 
these estimates—crime rates have largely declined or stabilized.  Be-
tween 1992 and 1999, homicide rates declined to 1960s levels.9  The 
national crime rate reached a historic low in 2000.10  During this peri-
od of lower crime rates, states used cost projections to make the most 
of their limited resources by slowing both the growth of their incarcer-
ation rates and the rate of spending on corrections.11  Indeed, these 
forecasts have been so useful that the American Bar Association has 
included the use of cost forecasts as a key recommendation in its pro-
posed Model Sentencing Act.12  The Act requires an impact analysis on 
the theory that “it is in every state’s interest to coordinate resource and 
policy decisions.”13 
These forecasts have not only influenced particular sentencing de-
bates, they have also improved the overall political standing of state 
commissions with their respective legislatures.  State commissions that 
use forecasts “have found that, over time, as their resource projections 
have been shown to be accurate and objectively-determined, their leg-
islatures have placed ever greater stock in their forecasts, affording the 
commissions a deepening reputation for credibility, and allowing their 
research to play a more powerful role in legislative deliberations.”14 
Cost forecasting is particularly important in today’s strained eco-
nomic climate.  The states spent $51.1 billion on corrections in 2010, 
constituting 3.1% of their annual budgets.15  After a brief dip between 
2009 and 2010, state corrections budgets resumed their upward climb 
last year; early tallies for fiscal year 2011 put the total at $51.7 billion.16  
At the federal level, where the government spends over $5 billion on 
 
9 See Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman, The Recent Rise and Fall of American Violence, 
in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 1, 3 -4 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000). 
10 Emma Schwartz, Crime Rates Shown to Be Falling, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 11, 
2008, http://www.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2008/06/11/crime-rates-shown- 
to-be-falling.  
11 See Barkow & O’Neill, supra note 1, at 2008-09. 
12 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  SENTENCING § 18 -2.3 (1994). 
13 Kevin R. Reitz & Curtis R. Reitz, Building a Sentencing Reform Agenda:  The ABA’s 
New Sentencing Standards, 78 JUDICATURE 189, 194 (1995). 
14 Kevin R. Reitz, Am. Law Inst., Model Penal Code:  Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 525, 592-93 (2002). 
15 NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 2010, at 52 
(2011), available at http://nasbo.org/sites/default/files/2010%20State%20Expenditure% 
20Report.pdf. 
16 Id. 
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corrections,17 these expenditures are rising rapidly.  From 1982 to 
2003, the federal government increased corrections expenditures by 
925%.18  Moreover, between 1995 and 2004, the federal prison popula-
tion increased at an annual average rate of 7.8%, compared to an aver-
age annual increase of 2.7% in the states.19  The federal system, which 
is the largest prison system in the country,20 exceeds its capacity by 
36%.21  Using cost forecasting, the federal and state governments 
could realize fiscal rationality and implement better, and more cost-
effective, criminal justice policies.   And the commissions providing 
this information could potentially improve their standing and influ-
ence with their respective legislatures by providing valuable infor-
mation on the costs of any policy under consideration. 
Because legislative debates often overlook the availability and best 
use of resources, this enforced cost projection is particularly valuable.  
The extent to which many sentencing laws require large capital ex-
penditures—such as the maintenance and construction of prison facil-
ities or the hiring of staff—often goes unrecognized.  Although the 
costs of longer terms of imprisonment might be worth it for many of-
fenses and offenders, the money spent on some extended prison terms 
could be better spent somewhere else:  for example, confining more 
serious offenders, providing alternatives to incarceration for some 
nonviolent offenders, or making more money available for policing or 
education.  Because the political process does not always reasonably 
consider how to allocate its resources,22 commission-provided cost data 
 
17 See KRISTEN A. HUGHES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
BULLETIN:  JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2003, at 3, 
9, available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jeeus03.pdf (reporting total fed-
eral spending on corrections—defined broadly to include incarceration, community 
supervision, and rehabilitation programs—at $5.55 billion in 2003).  Federal expendi-
tures in 2003 were $2.59 trillion dollars.  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 
2012, at 22 tbl.1.1 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2012-
TAB/pdf/BUDGET-2012-TAB.pdf. 
18 See HUGHES, supra note 17, at 2. 
19 PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, BULLETIN:  PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2004, at 2 tbl.1 (2005), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pjim04.pdf. 
20 Id. at 1. 
21 PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
BULLETIN:  PRISONERS IN 2010, at 7 (2011) available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/p10.pdf. 
22 See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
1276, 1292 (2005) (“The current political process is disproportionately likely . . . to 
ignore or pay far less attention to the costs of incarceration.”). 
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can focus attention on fiscal concerns and provide politicians with the 
information they need to ensure that limited government funds are 
spent wisely. 
This vision of a sentencing commission’s role comports with the 
overall place of agencies in government and their ability to use exper-
tise to serve political goals.  Cost-benefit analysis is a centerpiece of the 
modern regulatory state, particularly at the federal level.  For example, 
the Office of Management and Budget engages in a cost-benefit analy-
sis for regulations proposed by executive agencies.23  The Federal Sen-
tencing Commission is not subject to this oversight, but its Guidelines 
should be influenced by efficiency concerns all the same.  Sentencing 
policies, like all other government policies, should seek to make gov-
ernment as efficient and effective as possible.  States are not as atten-
tive to cost-benefit analysis as the federal government, but in many 
states, policies are similarly evaluated for their effect on state budgets.24  
It is essential to good governance, at both state and federal levels, to 
ensure that any proposed policy maximizes welfare at the lowest cost.25  
The data that unite politics and expertise are not limited to costs.  
A sound evaluation of sentencing laws must look at not only the costs 
but also the benefits of these laws.  To that end, in addition to produc-
ing information on the costs of various sentencing proposals, commis-
sions are well positioned to collect data on the effect various 
sentencing proposals have on recidivism and crime rates.  This infor-
mation is salient in political debates and can motivate political action.   
Some sentencing commissions, including those in Pennsylvania, 
North Carolina, and Kansas, have explicit mandates to release this kind 
of information.  Pennsylvania empowers its commission to “[c]ollect 
 
23 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 ( Jan. 21, 2011).  
24 JASON A. SCHWARTZ, INST. FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, 52 EXPERIMENTS WITH REGU-
LATORY REVIEW:  THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INPUTS INTO STATE RULEMAKING 87 
(2010), available at http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/52_Experiments_with_ 
Regulatory_Review.pdf (noting that “45 states require some form of economic impact 
analysis” when considering the implementation of new regulations).  
25 See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS:  WHY LIBERTY 
DEPENDS ON TAXES 228-29 (1999) (arguing that public deliberation should be focused 
on, among other things, how much to spend on a given right and “the optimal package 
of rights, given that the resources that go to protect one right will no longer be availa-
ble to protect another right”); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING 
RATIONALITY:  HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 
AND OUR HEALTH 12-13 (2008) (discussing the advantages of cost-benefit analysis in 
government decisionmaking, even for government regulation motivated by goals other 
than efficiency, because it achieves more rational government programs, increases ac-
countability and transparency, and structures and channels exercises of discretion by 
government decisionmakers). 
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systematically and disseminate information regarding effectiveness of 
parole dispositions and sentences imposed.”26  In 2006, the Pennsylva-
nia Commission on Sentencing began a multiyear study of sentenc-
ing’s effect on recidivism.27  Similarly, North Carolina’s commission 
has a statutory command to collect data and regularly report on both 
adult and juvenile recidivism.28  Kansas’s mandate to its commission is 
even broader.  Its statute requires the agency to “analyze . . . and make 
recommendations for improvements in criminal law, prosecution, 
community and correctional placement, programs, release procedures 
and related matters including study and recommendations concerning 
the statutory definition of crimes and criminal penalties and review of 
proposed criminal law changes.”29  
The Washington State Institute for Public Policy provides the 
preeminent model for how data collection can improve public policy.  
The Institute analyzes alternatives to incarceration, measures sentenc-
ing laws’ effects on recidivism, and assesses the cost effectiveness of 
criminal justice programs.30  Created by the state legislature in 1983, 
the Institute researches a wide array of public policy issues.31  In the 
area of criminal law, the Institute works directly with state agencies and 
lawmakers to provide data and concrete recommendations on specific 
policies.  For example, the Washington Department of Corrections 
contracted with the Institute to determine best practices for community 
supervision of offenders,32 and the state legislature asked for an evalua-
tion of the effects of a 2003 law on recidivism rates.33   
 
26 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2153(a)(11) (West Supp. 2011). 
27 Effectiveness of Sentencing Project, PA. COMM’N ON SENTENCING, http://pcs.la.psu.edu/ 
publications-and-research/research-and-evaluation-reports/special-reports/effectiveness- 
of-sentencing-project (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). 
28 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 164 -48 (West 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 164 -47 (West, 
Westlaw through S.L. 2012-1 at the 2011 Regular Session of the General Assembly). 
29 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101 (West Supp. 2010). 
30 See generally WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ 
default.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). 
31 Id.   
32 See ELIZABETH K. DRAKE, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, “WHAT WORKS” IN 
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION:  INTERIM REPORT 1 (2011), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ 
rptfiles/11-12-1201.pdf (outlining the research questions posed by the Department of 
Corrections for the Institute’s report on community supervision). 
33 See ELIZABETH K. DRAKE ET AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, INCREASED 
EARNED RELEASE FROM PRISON:  IMPACTS OF A 2003 LAW ON RECIDIVISM AND CRIME 
COSTS, REVISED 1 (2009), available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/09-04-1201.pdf 
(providing an overview of the legislature’s request and finding that the 2003 law de-
creased recidivism overall, lowered prison costs, and increased earnings through labor). 
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To be sure, arguments based on cost-benefit analyses will not always 
win the day in political debates.  The politics of crime remain too 
heated for that.  But when the time is politically right, even once-
ignored data can reemerge to influence policy.   
Consider in this regard the U.S. Sentencing Commission.  Congress 
has vested the Commission with a research and data collection func-
tion, instructing it to “develop means of measuring the degree to 
which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in 
meeting the purposes of sentencing”34 and to “collect systematically 
the data obtained from studies, research, and the empirical experi-
ence of public and private agencies concerning the sentencing pro-
cess.”35  The Sentencing Commission has produced extensive and well-
researched reports on issues such as mandatory minimum sentencing 
laws,36 the disparity between crack and powder cocaine,37 alternatives to 
incarceration,38 and a host of other topics.39   Congress has often ig-
nored the Commission’s advice and recommendations40—as it did 
when the Commission proposed eliminating the disparity between 
sentences for crack and powder cocaine in 1995.41  But Commission 
reports that Congress and the Executive branch initially ignored have, 
over time, influenced the debate over sentencing.  For example, with 
the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,42 Congress finally re-
vised its approach to the disparate treatment of crack and powder co-
 
34 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(2) (2006). 
35 Id. § 995(a)(13). 
36 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  MANDA-
TORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991), available  
at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_ 
Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_Penalties/199108_RtC_Mandatory_Minimum.htm. 
37 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY (2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public 
_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/200705_RtC_Cocaine_
Sentencing_Policy.pdf. 
38 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_ 
Projects/Alternatives/20090206_Alternatives.pdf. 
39 See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDE TO PUBLICATIONS & RESOURCES 
(2010–2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Publications/2010_Guide_to_Publications_ 
and_Resources.pdf (providing a list of reports that the Commission has prepared). 
40 See Barkow, supra note 6, at 767-70. 
41 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE 
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1995), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative 
_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/199502_Rt
C_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy/index.htm. 
42 Pub. L. No. 111-120, 124 Stat. 2372. 
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caine offenses, referring to the Commission’s research on the subject 
when it did so.43 
II.  RACE 
The emergence of sentencing guidelines is in large measure a story 
about the desire for racial justice.44  Unfortunately, even a cursory look 
at criminal justice in the United States—in states with or without 
guidelines—demonstrates that questions of racial justice have hardly 
been answered.  The numbers show a widely disproportionate impact 
on some racial and ethnic minorities.  Blacks and Hispanics are dis-
proportionately incarcerated relative to their numbers in the general 
population.  While the American population is 12.6% black and 16.3% 
Hispanic,45 blacks comprise 37.9% of the American prison population, 
and Hispanics 22.3%.46  Of 216,361 federal prisoners, 81,211 individu-
als (37.5%) are black and 74,931 (34.6%) are Hispanic.47  In 2010, 
71.4% of federal drug offenders were black or Hispanic.48  More than 
11% of black men under the age of 40 are imprisoned, and more than 
20% of black men born since the late 1960s have spent at least a year, 
and typically two, in prison for a felony conviction.49  Some cities have 
40-50% of their young black men under some form of criminal justice 
system supervision.50  “If brought together in one incorporated region, 
 
43 Attorney General Holder referred to the Commission’s report on the crack-
powder disparity in his speech reaffirming the Department’s commitment to seeking 
an end to that disparity.  See Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks for the Charles Hamilton 
Houston Institute for Race and Justice and Congressional Black Caucus Symposium:  
Rethinking Federal Sentencing Policy 25th Anniversary of the Sentencing Reform Act 
( June 24, 2009) [hereinafter Holder Speech], available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/ 
speeches/2009/ag-speech-0906241.html. 
44 See Barkow, supra note 6, at 742 (“The left supported sentencing reform based on 
a concern . . . that minorities and the poor were being disproportionately penalized.”); 
cf. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (2011) (stating that race, among 
other factors, is “not relevant in the determination of a sentence”). 
45 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN:  2010, at 4 tbl.1 
(2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf. 
46 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 26 tbl.12 (2011), available at http:// 
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf. 
47 FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Quick Facts About the Bureau of Prisons, http:// 
www.bcp.gov/news/quick.jsp (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). 
48 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
2010 tbl.34, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and 
_Sourcebooks/2010/Table34.pdf. 
49 See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 19 tbl.2, 26 (2006). 
50 See Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revisited, 64 
U. COLO. L. REV. 743, 744 (1993) (noting that 42% of black men in their twenties in 
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the black males who are now in prison would instantly become the 
twelfth-largest urban area in the country.”51  Almost one-third of black 
men can expect to be incarcerated during their lifetimes under cur-
rent trends.  Black children are more than seven times more likely to 
have a parent in prison than white children.52  
Some states have begun to investigate why the numbers are so dis-
proportionate.  For example, in 2008, Iowa was the first state in the 
country to pass legislation requiring a minority impact statement for 
any proposed criminal law.53  Both parties overwhelmingly endorsed 
the law—the Iowa House voted unanimously in favor of it, and the 
Senate approved the law 47-2.54  The law requires that all new criminal 
laws be examined before they are passed to determine how they will im-
pact minorities.55  The minority impact statement requirement allows 
Iowa legislators to anticipate disparities and, where possible, pursue an 
alternative path to accomplishing its goals to avoid those disparities.    
Connecticut and Illinois have also recently passed legislation that 
mandates a legislative evaluation of the racial and ethnic impact of 
certain criminal justice legislation.  Connecticut requires racial impact 
statements as part of a broader statute that creates remedies for 
wrongfully convicted individuals.56  It passed overwhelmingly in the 
House (126-11) and unanimously in the Senate, and was signed into 
law in June 2008.57  Illinois followed suit a few months later when Gov-
ernor Rod Blagojevich signed Senate Bill 2476 into law.58  The bill as 
 
Washington, D.C., and 56% in Baltimore are “under the control of the criminal justice 
system on any day”). 
51 DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS:  BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 183 (2004). 
52 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 2 
(2009), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/ 
inc_incarceratedparents.pdf.  This problem promises to become only more acute be-
cause “[e]thnic and racial minorities will comprise a majority of the nation’s population 
in a little more than a generation, according to new Census Bureau projections.”  Sam 
Roberts, A Generation Away, Minorities May Become the Majority in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
14, 2008, at A1.  
53 Act of Apr. 17, 2008, 2008 Iowa Acts 312 (codified at IOWA CODE § 2.56 (2009)). 
54 See H. JOURNAL, 82nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 897-98 (Iowa 2008), available at 
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/pubs/hjweb/pdf/March%2025,%202008.pdf#page=27; 
S. JOURNAL, 82nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., at 869 (Iowa 2008), available at https:// 
www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/pubs/sjweb/pdf/March%2031,%202008.pdf#page=19. 
55 2008 Iowa Acts 312. 
56 See 2008 Conn. Acts 489 (Reg. Sess.). 
57 Id. 
58 See Commission to Study Disproportionate Justice Impact Act, Pub. Act 095-0995, 
2008 Ill. Laws 3698. 
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introduced mandated legislative racial impact reports;59 the form that 
eventually passed instead created a panel to study the problem.60   This 
commission disbanded after issuing its report in December 2010, 
which included a recommendation that lawmakers reconsider racial 
impact statements.61  
In Wisconsin, Governor Jim Doyle did not wait for legislative action 
to mandate racial impact statements for agency regulations.  In May 
2008, he issued an executive order that required all state agencies to 
track the racial impact of their policies and created a Racial Disparities 
Oversight Commission.62  The panel was not empowered to issue racial 
impact statements per se but was tasked with reducing racial disparity 
across the criminal justice system.63   
Some sentencing commissions have also explored the impact of 
the guidelines on different racial groups.64  Even before Iowa’s legisla-
ture mandated racial impact statements, Minnesota’s sentencing 
commission was the first body actually to provide such estimates.  It 
began doing so on its own initiative in early 2008.65  The U.S. Sentenc-
 
59 S.B. 2476, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007–2008). 
60 Commission to Study Disproportionate Justice Impact Act § 5, 2008 Ill. Laws at 3699. 
61 See ILL. DISPROPORTIONATE JUSTICE IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 42-
43 (2010), available at http://www.centerforhealthandjustice.org/DJIS_FullReport_ 
FINAL.pdf (recommending that disproportionate minority contact with the justice 
system should be addressed through state-level policy, statutory changes, additional 
funding, and the reduction of the harmful long-term effects of conviction). 
62 See Wis. Gov. Exec. Order No. 251 (May 2008), available at https://docs.legis. 
wisconsin.gov/code/executive_orders/2003_ jim_doyle/2008-251.pdf (noting that the 
Commission on Reducing Racial Disparities in Wisconsin “was created to determine 
whether discrimination is built into the criminal justice system at each stage of the 
criminal justice continuum”). 
63 See id. (ordering the Commission “to exercise oversight and advocacy concerning 
programs and policies to reduce disparate treatment of people of color across the spec-
trum of the criminal justice system”).  In early 2010, Governor Scott Walker disbanded 
the Commission as part of a broader austerity program.  Alex Ebert, State Cuts Poet Lau-
reate Board; He’ll Keep Job, WISCNEWS.COM, Mar. 8, 2011, 11:45 PM, http://www.wiscnews. 
com/portagedailyregister/news/article_6d75a0bc-4a11-11e0-9255-001cc4c002e0.html. 
64 For general overviews of noncommission research on the relationship between 
race and sentencing, see JOHN H. KRAMER & JEFFERY T. ULMER, SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES:  LESSONS FROM PENNSYLVANIA 90-101 (2009), which surveys research on Pennsyl-
vania’s sentencing disparities, and Cassia C. Spohn, Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform:  The 
Quest for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process, 3 CRIM. JUSTICE 427, 429 (2000), which lists 
studies in this area.  
65 See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 14 
(2009), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/data_reports/jan_leg_report/leg_ 
report_ jan09.pdf; Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements:  Changing Policies to Address 
Disparities, 23 CRIM. JUSTICE, Winter 2009, at 16, 17 (naming Iowa as the first state to 
pass a law mandating such considerations).  
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ing Commission has also studied the relationship between the federal 
guidelines and race.66  The sentencing commissions in Maryland and 
North Carolina have both mounted comprehensive investigations into 
racial disparity and sentencing in the past,67 though neither has re-
turned to the issue in detail in recent years.68  Depending on the insti-
tutional design of a state’s sentencing commission, the commission 
may be the best-placed agency not only to investigate potential racial 
disparities in sentencing but also to apply what it learns to its future 
policy choices.   
But more should be done.  Given the critical role guidelines play 
in jurisdictions where they exist, it is crucial to understand the effect 
guidelines have on defendants of different races.  Exploring this ques-
tion falls within the statutory mandates of most sentencing commis-
sions, as they are often charged with avoiding unwarranted 
 
66 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SEN-
TENCING PRACTICES:  AN UPDATE OF THE BOOKER REPORT ’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS 23 (2010) (analyzing the disparity in sentences between different racial and 
ethnic groups over time); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES 
SENTENCING:  AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS 
ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 113-35 (2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN 
YEAR REVIEW] (providing an in-depth analysis of the Guidelines’ racially disparate ef-
fects and identifying the sentencing rules that create the most significant adverse im-
pacts on African Americans).  For a criticism of the Sentencing Commission’s 2010 
Report, see Jeffery T. Ulmer et. al, Racial Disparity in the Wake of the Booker/Fanfan Deci-
sion:  An Alternative Analysis to the USSC’s 2010 Report, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 
1077 (2011). 
67 See DEBORAH DAWES ET AL., N.C. SENTENCING & POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, 
SENTENCING PRACTICES UNDER NORTH CAROLINA’S STRUCTURED SENTENCING LAWS 
4 (2002), available at http://www.nccourts.org/courts/crs/councils/spac/documents/ 
disparityreportforwebr_060209.pdf (attempting to establish the presence of sentencing 
disparities in North Carolina); CLAIRE SOURYAL & CHARLES WELLFORD, REPORT TO 
THE MARYLAND COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY, AN EXAMINATION 
OF UNWARRANTED SENTENCING DISPARITY UNDER MARYLAND’S VOLUNTARY SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES 9-22 (1997), available at http://www.msccsp.org/Files/Reports/ 
Souryal%20and%20Wellford%20(1997)%20An%20Examination%20of%20Unwarrant 
ed%20%E2%80%A6.pdf (evaluating the prevalence of racial disparities in sentencing 
in Maryland).  
68 North Carolina’s commission does issue annual reports with sentencing statistics 
that include breakdowns based on race.  See, e.g., AMY CRADDOCK & TAMARA FLINCHUM, 
N.C. SENTENCING & POL’Y ADVISORY COMM’N, STRUCTURED SENTENCING STATISTICAL 
REPORT FOR FELONIES AND MISDEMEANORS:  FISCAL YEAR 2009/10, at 9 fig.D (2011), avail-
able at http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/spac/Documents/statisticalrpt_ 
fy09-10.pdf.  The most recent treatment of this issue by Maryland’s Commission on 
Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Judicial Process was in a 2004 study based on the ex-
periences of actual litigants, witnesses, and jurors and their perceptions of bias in the 
criminal justice system, but the study did not focus on sentencing.  REPORT OF THE MD. 
COMM’N ON RACIAL & ETHNIC FAIRNESS IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (2004), available at 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/racialethnicfairness04.pdf. 
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disparities.69  These data will undoubtedly be enormously important 
to elected officials.  If a legislator knows that a proposed sentencing 
law will disproportionately affect a particular group, he can consider 
alternatives that achieve the same goals without the disparate effects.      
More research is also needed on the relationship between prose-
cutorial discretion, sentencing, and race. The work of the Vera Insti-
tute of Justice provides a helpful model.  The Institute has been 
working with district attorneys in Milwaukee, San Diego, and Meck-
lenburg County, North Carolina as part of its Prosecution and Racial 
Justice initiative.70  The pilot program uses statistical indicators and em-
pirical evidence in an attempt to increase transparency and uniformity 
in prosecutors’ charging decisions by alerting them when their offices’ 
aggregate decisionmaking appears to exhibit racial or ethnic biases.71  
The goal of  all this research is to unearth the causes of the striking 
disparities we see in the population under penal supervision and under-
stand how shifts in sentencing policy could ameliorate these disparities.   
III.  WHEN POLITICS AND EXPERTISE CONFLICT 
Although there will be many opportunities for commissions to use 
expert data in a way that influences political overseers, inevitably there 
will be conflicts.  Legislative sentencing determinations are a mixed 
lot.  Some determinations are the product of deliberation and consid-
eration of relevant data.  Others—perhaps most—are the product of 
political posturing based on little-to-no research.72  The question for 
commissions is how this latter type of legislative judgment should affect 
the formulation of guidelines.  Many times, the answer is clear because 
the legislature has left no role for the commission.  This happens when 
 
69 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006)  (“The purposes of the United States 
Sentencing Commission are to . . . establish sentencing policies and practices for the 
Federal criminal justice system that . . . provide certainty and fairness in meeting the 
purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants 
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct . . . .” (em-
phasis added)). 
70 See Prosecution and Racial Justice, VERA INST. JUST., http://www.vera.org/project/ 
prosecution-and-racial-justice (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (describing a pilot program 
designed to identify evidence of racial or ethnic bias among district attorney’s offices).  
71 Id. 
72 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, 
New York University School of Law, Supporting Petitioners at 6-10, Dorsey v. United 
States & United States v. Hill, at *5-10, Nos. 11-5683 & 11-5721 (consolidated) (U.S. 
Feb. 1, 2012), 2012 WL 362807 (detailing the absence of research to support Con-
gress’s decision to create the 100-to-1 crack/powder ratio in cocaine sentencing). 
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a legislature passes a statute demanding a particular guideline amend-
ment or enacts a sentencing law that trumps a guideline.    
In other situations, however, there may be a political judgment 
that is at odds with the commission’s judgment.  Then there is an open 
question for the commission to resolve:  should the commission extend 
the political judgment into a related area or limit the political decision 
to its sphere and take it no further?  In this context, the best approach 
for a commission—unless the legislative body explicitly orders other-
wise—is to accept legislative judgments based on political factors but 
not to extend them further than the legislature commands if doing so 
would conflict with the commission’s expert judgment.   
The relationship between sentencing guidelines and mandatory 
minimum sentences set by legislatures without careful study provides a 
prime illustration of this point.  If the mandatory minimum is not the 
product of careful study or research, then keying all guidelines to that 
minimum exacerbates the harms of a failure to reflect on the conse-
quences and goes against an agency’s mission to base its decisions on 
empirical information and studies. 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s treatment of mandatory mini-
mums for drug crimes provides a cautionary tale.  When the Commis-
sion developed its initial set of sentencing guideline ranges for drug 
trafficking, it incorporated statutory mandatory minimum sentences 
into the federal sentencing grid so that the trafficking guidelines, like 
mandatory minimum laws, were driven largely by the drug quantity 
involved.73  Moreover, the sentences for all quantities have been set 
based on the sentences Congress selected for mandatory minimums.74  
Thus, offenses involving five or more grams of crack cocaine, as well as 
all other drug offenses carrying a five-year mandatory minimum penalty, 
were assigned a base offense level of 26, which corresponded to a 
guideline range of 63-78 months for a defendant in the lowest criminal 
history category.75  Likewise, drug offenses carrying a ten-year mandatory 
minimum penalty were assigned a base offense level of 32, which corre-
sponded to a sentencing guideline range of 121-151 months for a de-
fendant in the lowest criminal history category.76   
 
73 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 66, at 15, 48-49 (noting that “statutory min-
imum penalties” drove drug trafficking guidelines and that the minimums were often 
“triggered” by the weight of the substance containing the drug, not just the amount of 
the pure drug found). 
74 Id. at 49.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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“[N]o other decision of the Commission,” the Commission has 
noted, “has had such a profound impact on the federal prison popula-
tion.”77  Indeed, this initial set of judgments accounts for much of the 
increase in the federal prison population and for a large measure of 
the racial disparities in its composition.78  Judges have widely con-
demned these Guidelines as too harsh.79  And yet the Commission has 
offered little to defend this choice.  The Commission did not explain 
at the time this fundamental decision was made what was the motivat-
ing rationale.   
So why did the Commission take this path?  Most likely, it was try-
ing to be respectful of its political overseers.  Once Congress set these 
sentences, the Commission seems to have wanted to respect the role of 
mandatory minimums in the overall sentencing landscape and avoid 
“cliffs” in sentencing, where offenders find themselves with vastly dif-
ferent penalties depending on whether they reached the mandatory 
minimum threshold or fell just below it. 80  The discussion at one of its 
regional hearings suggested that the Commission might have taken 
this approach to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 994, which requires the 
Commission to issue guidelines “consistent with all pertinent provi-
sions of any federal statute,” including mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing statutes.81 
There are, however, several problems with the Commission’s deci-
sion to give mandatory minimum laws such a broad influence on the 
Federal Guidelines.  First, a particular sentencing statute, such as a 
statute requiring mandatory minimums, is often at odds with other 
 
77 Id. 
78 See id. at 76 (“Given that drug trafficking constitutes the largest offense group 
sentenced in the federal courts, the two-and-a-half time increase in their average prison 
term has been the single sentencing policy change having the greatest impact on pris-
on populations.”); see also id. at 132 (“This one sentencing rule contributes more to the 
differences in average sentences between African-American and White offenders than 
any possible effect of discrimination.”). 
79 See id. at 52 (discussing a 2002 survey that found that 31% of district judges 
ranked “drug sentencing as the greatest or second greatest challenge for the guidelines 
in achieving the purposes of sentencing” and that “73.7% of district court judges and 
82.7[%] of circuit court judges rated drug punishments as greater than appropriate to 
reflect [their] seriousness”). 
80 See id. at 50.  Another explanation posited in the Commission’s Fifteen Year Review 
is that the Commission imposed these mandatory minimums because the quantities are 
reasonable measures of harm.  See id. at 49-50.  But the report goes on to note, “Drug 
quantity has been called a particularly poor proxy for the culpability of low-level offend-
ers, who may have contact with significant amounts of drugs, but who do not share in the 
profits or decision-making.”  Id. at 50. 
81 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2006). 
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general statutory commands that a commission must follow.  This situ-
ation holds true for the U.S. Sentencing Commission, which is re-
quired under 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A) to establish guidelines that 
meet the sentencing purposes set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).82   
These purposes include providing punishments that “reflect the seri-
ousness of the offense,” “promote respect for the law,” and “provide 
just punishment.”83  The Commission would violate the command of 
§ 3553(a)(2) by using mandatory minimums to set other sentences if 
those mandatory minimums did not fulfill one of the statute’s goals.  
This conclusion is consistent with § 994 because the Guidelines can set 
sentences tied to drug quantities without reference to mandatory min-
imums while emphasizing that relevant mandatory minimums will 
trump a different Guidelines sentence.  Indeed, this is the only ap-
proach that reconciles § 3553(a)(2) and § 994, and it justifies any cliffs 
that this sentencing scheme would create. 
Further these types of cliffs are hardly new to criminal law. At 
common law, the line between grand larceny and petit larceny rested 
on whether the value of the property stolen exceeded twelve pence.84  
If the stolen amount was above this threshold, the larceny was a capital 
offense.  But stealing any amount below twelve pence received a pun-
ishment of only a forfeiture and a whipping.85  A sentencing scheme in 
which applicable mandatory minimums would trump sentences oth-
erwise set by guidelines would not create such dramatic differences in 
punishment.  Moreover, any time the legislature opts to set mandatory 
penalties on the basis of bright-line thresholds, it anticipates that cliffs 
will result.  Thus, there is no reason for commissions to focus on avoid-
ing these disparities in sentencing at the expense of their expert 
judgments about where sentences should be set. 
More fundamentally, although allowing mandatory minimums to 
trump guidelines sentences would create some disproportionate sen-
tences, the alternative approach of keying sentences to mandatory 
minimums leads to even greater disproportionality86 and undercuts the 
value of using empirical information and expertise to establish sen-
tences.  Neither solution results in perfect sentencing across the 
board, so the best a commission can do is create a sentencing regime 
that is based as much as possible on its expert judgment.  In the case 
 
82 See id. § 991(b)(1)(A). 
83 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
84 ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 335 (3d ed. 1982). 
85 Id. 
86 See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text. 
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of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, statutory commands make this 
preference for expertise explicit.  The Commission’s guidelines must 
“reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of hu-
man behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.”87  The 
Commission cannot ignore its statutory mandate to create a just sen-
tencing regime based on knowledge and expertise and simply accept 
Congress’s view about the sentence for one particular offense as the 
appropriate baseline for every other similar offense. 
Congress did not consult the Commission in setting its mandatory 
minimums, and it did not base them on “advancement in knowledge 
of human behavior.”88  While mandatory minimums are binding, Con-
gress has never explicitly stated that these minimums were meant to 
replace the Commission’s expertise in setting all other guidelines sen-
tences for which there are no mandatory minimums.  Congress’s fail-
ure to provide a simple directive indicating otherwise suggests that it 
left the question of appropriate sentences for offenses without manda-
tory minimums to the Commission’s judgment.   
There are good reasons to adopt a presumption that limits statutes 
based on political judgments to their narrowest interpretation unless 
there is evidence to the contrary.   First, because legislators obtain val-
uable information from commissions, narrow interpretations of legis-
lative enactments allow legislatures to update their policies in light of a 
commission’s conclusions.  If, for instance, a commission’s expert 
judgment reveals that drug sentencing should vary from the legislative 
mandatory minimums, the legislature may use that information to re-
vise its own approach to sentencing.  Under the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s current approach, in contrast, the legislature would not 
receive that feedback because its mandatory minimums would be ac-
cepted and incorporated wholesale into the guideline structure without 
the Commission’s independent analysis.  This wide application of legis-
lative judgments stifles dialogue between the Commission and the legis-
lature and fails to capitalize on the value of the expert assessments. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kimbrough v. United States89 lends 
further support to this view.  In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court held 
that federal district judges could deviate from a guidelines sentence 
based on a policy disagreement with the disparate treatment of crack 
 
87 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C). 
88 Id. 
89 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
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and powder cocaine.90  In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed 
to the Commission’s own research disagreeing with the disparity.91  
The Court rejected the notion that federal statutes mandating mini-
mum sentences that treated crack and powder differently 
“‘[i]mplicit[ly]’ require[] the Commission and sentencing courts” to 
treat the drugs differently.92  The Court observed that the “statute, by 
its terms, mandates only maximum and minimum sentences,” but “says 
nothing about the appropriate sentences within these brackets.”93  
Consistent with the argument here, the Court “decline[d] to read any 
implicit directive into that congressional silence,” especially when 
“Congress has shown that it knows how to direct sentencing practices 
in express terms.”94   
The Court further intimated that the Guidelines merit greater re-
spect when they are based on the Commission’s institutional expertise 
than when they are not.  Because the guidelines addressing crack and 
powder cocaine were not based on empirical data but were solely tied 
to the congressional mandatory minimums, the Court noted that vari-
ances from those guidelines would not amount to an abuse of discre-
tion if a district court concluded that adhering to them would yield a 
sentence greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing 
laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).95  Some lower courts have agreed that 
guidelines based on expertise and empirical data deserve more respect 
than those that are not.96  It is likely that regardless of the standard of 
 
90 Id. at 110. 
91 Id. at 97-100 (citing Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 
28,558, 28,571-72 (May 21, 2007); Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United 
States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,074, 25,075-77 (May 10, 1995); U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, supra note 37, at 8-10; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, at iv, viii, 93-94, 96, 100-03 (2002); U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING 
POLICY 2 (1997); and U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 41, at 66-67, 174). 
92 Id. at 102 (first and second alterations in original) (quoting Brief for the United 
States at 32, Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 85 (No. 06-6330), 2007 WL 2461473, at *32). 
93 Id. at 102-03. 
94 Id. at 103. 
95 Id. at 109-10. 
96 See, e.g., United States v. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d 405, 418 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“Kimbrough instructs sentencing courts to give less deference” where the Commission is 
not acting “‘in its characteristic role,’ in which it typically implements guidelines only 
after taking into account ‘empirical data and national experience.’” (quoting Kim-
brough, 552 U.S. at 109)); United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 150 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (expressing agreement with the First Circuit’s interpretation of Kimbrough in 
United States v. Rodriguez); United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 227 (1st Cir. 2008) 
(“[G]uidelines and policy statements [not based on empirical data and national expe-
rience] deserve less deference . . . .” (citing Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109-10)).  But see, 
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review, judges will have greater respect for guideline sentences 
grounded in empirical research than for those based on congressional 
decisions that rest on anecdotal cases instead of a comprehensive re-
view of all relevant facts. 
IV.  THE LIMITS OF GUIDELINES 
Having discussed the role of expertise in setting guidelines, it is 
important to note the limits of expertise itself when it comes to sen-
tencing.  Indeed, perhaps the greatest lesson to take away from the 
experience with the guidelines is that they can only do so much, even 
if they are grounded solely in expertise and are uncorrupted by patho-
logical political dynamics.  This Part discusses three important limits to 
any guidelines regime.   
A.  Guidelines Cannot Capture All Human Behavior 
Any successful guidelines system must strike a balance between indi-
vidualization and uniformity.97  Put another way, guidelines should treat 
like cases alike but also acknowledge real differences.  There is, at the 
risk of understatement, an inherent tension between these two goals.98   
The guidelines movement grew out of dissatisfaction with discre-
tionary and indeterminate sentencing regimes that focused too much 
on individualization and not enough on avoiding unjust disparities.99  
 
e.g., United States v. Gonzales-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 740-41 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that Kimbrough authorized downward departures if the district court disagreed with the 
Commission’s reasoning behind the Guidelines, not if the court disagreed with con-
gressional policy). 
97 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B), for example, directs the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
to establish sentencing policies that  
provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient 
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or 
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sen-
tencing practices. 
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
98 See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (explaining that “[s]ince 
the early days of the common law, the legal system has struggled to accommodate these 
twin objectives” of individualization and consistency). 
99 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 66, at xviii (citing the perceived unfairness 
of indeterminate sentencing as a factor behind the adoption of federal sentencing 
guidelines); Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines:  Diversity, Consensus, and Unre-
solved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1202 (2005) (describing state sentencing 
guidelines as “always motivated at least in part by a desire to make sentencing more 
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Unfortunately, the movement’s reaction against the prior regime 
often placed too much emphasis on uniformity and not enough on 
individualization. 
Exhibit A for this obsessive focus on uniformity is the federal sys-
tem.  The federal system has concentrated almost exclusively on elimi-
nating judicial discretion, too often resulting in the exclusion of 
remedies that are proportionally based on individual conduct.  Con-
gress bears primary responsibility for this lopsided approach.  For ex-
ample, the congressional “25 percent rule” provides that the 
maximum of a sentencing guidelines range for a term of imprison-
ment “shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the 
greater of 25 percent or 6 months.”100  This law was meant to promote 
uniformity and restrict judicial discretion in sentencing.101    
Congress further sought to limit judicial discretion to individualize 
sentences by enacting laws that trump the Guidelines.  Mandatory 
minimum laws were the most significant measures aimed at curbing 
judicial discretion.102  However, these mandatory minimums have not 
resulted in greater equality in sentencing because prosecutors retain 
unreviewable discretion as to whether or not they will charge an indi-
vidual with an offense bearing a mandatory minimum sentence, a 
point that the Commission itself has noted.103  When prosecutors do 
elect to charge defendants with offenses carrying mandatory minimums, 
they prevent judges from sentencing defendants proportionately based 
on individualized factors.  Congress has enacted other statutes, like the 
 
uniform and to eliminate unwarranted disparities”).  See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, 
CRIMINAL SENTENCES:  LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973) (describing judicial discretion in 
sentencing as “terrifying and intolerable”). 
100 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2). 
101 See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 168-69 (1983); see also U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, The Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984:  Principal Features (Nov. 1996) (unpublished Simplification 
Draft Paper), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Working_Group_Reports/ 
Simplification/SRA.HTM (reviewing how the Sentencing Commission has interpreted 
the 25 percent rule, and considering alternative readings to ensure fairness but to 
permit some discretion). 
102 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 8-9 (1991) (tracking the 
evolution of mandatory minimum laws in the context of the Guidelines). 
103 See id. at 89 (“[D]efendants who appear to be similar are charged and convicted 
pursuant to mandatory minimum provisions differentially depending upon race, cir-
cuit, and prosecutorial practices . . . .”). 
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PROTECT Act,104 that similarly limit judicial discretion to sentence 
based on individualized factors. 
When they were mandatory, the Guidelines themselves prevented 
judges from achieving proportional punishments in many cases be-
cause they dramatically limited the grounds on which judges could 
depart from the guidelines.  Since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Booker,105 however, the federal system has placed more emphasis on 
individualizing sentences.106  Booker gives judges some room to adjust 
sentences based on relevant individual differences in setting punish-
ments by allowing them to deviate from the Guidelines to achieve the 
purposes of sentencing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).   
It is noteworthy that rates of within-guidelines sentences are 
roughly comparable throughout the country, regardless of whether 
the guidelines are mandatory or advisory, with most states seeing com-
pliance rates around eighty percent.107  The post-Booker experience in 
the federal system is consistent with this overall trend.108  This con-
 
104 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children 
Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 18, 21, 28, 42, and 47 U.S.C.). 
105 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
106 See D. Michael Fisher, Striking a Balance:  The Need to Temper Judicial Discretion 
Against a Background of Legislative Interest in Federal Sentencing, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 65, 98 
(2007) (“Booker has clearly wrought a new era in sentencing.  Federal judges . . . again 
retain discretion to sentence individual offenders based on individual determina-
tions.”); Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker:  A First Look, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 17 & fig.2 (2010) (noting a gradual but marked increase in the per-
centage of federal sentences falling outside the Guideline ranges). 
107 See Ronald F. Wright, Professor of Law & Assoc. Dean for Academic Affairs, 
Wake Forest Univ. School of Law, Statement Before the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
Regional Hearings Marking the 25th Anniversary of the Passage of the Sentencing Re-
form Act of 1984:  The Power of Information Versus the Power of Enforcement, at 6 -7 
(Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_ 
Hearings_and_Meetings/20090210-11/Wright_statement.pdf (noting that guidance 
compliance rates for Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Minnesota guidelines hovered 
around seventy-five percent despite dramatic differences in their legal force).  States with 
purely advisory guidelines report similar compliance rates.  See, e.g., VA. CRIMINAL SEN-
TENCING COMM’N, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 16 fig.2 (2008), available at http:// 
leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/By+Year/RD4152008/$file/RD415.pdf (showing that 
Virginia’s advisory guidelines have a compliance rate of 79.8%); Nat’l Ass’n of Sentencing 
Comm’ns, Maryland, SENTENCING GUIDELINE, Feb. 2009, at 7, available at http:// 
thenasc.org/images/2009_February_Issue.pdf (reporting that Maryland’s advisory guide-
lines have a compliance rate of approximately 80%, based on data from fiscal year 2008); 
David Oldfield, Mo. Sentencing Advisory Comm’n, Using the New Sentencing Tools 5 
( June 26, 2006), available at http://www.mosac.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=45415 (reporting Mis-
souri’s 81.9% compliance rate with its advisory guidelines). 
108 The Commission’s most recent quarterly report shows that judges are sentenc-
ing outside the guideline range without a government motion in 17.5% of cases.  U.S. 
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sistency in the proportion of cases sentenced within guidelines and 
those sentenced outside of them reflects the fact that while there is a 
core of cases that guidelines can capture, there remains a substantial 
minority of cases that do not fit the grid.  That the numbers are con-
sistent across varied jurisdictions suggests that there is a strong pull for 
individualizing sentences. 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission recently recognized this dynam-
ic when it relaxed the limits on considering individual circumstances 
in sentencing.  Before 2010, a defendant’s age, mental and emotional 
conditions, physical condition, and military service were deemed “not 
ordinarily relevant.”109  Now the Commission’s policy statement pro-
vides that these factors “may be relevant” in determining whether a 
departure is permitted if these factors are “present to an unusual de-
gree and distinguish the case from the typical cases.”110  This shift was 
in many ways a product of judges’ reliance on these individualized fac-
tors in the wake of Booker and of the Commission taking notice of the 
fact that these factors could be relevant in finding meaningful distinc-
tions between cases. 
It is, of course, hard to know where to strike the balance between 
individualization and uniformity.  But a main lesson of the guidelines 
is that expertise only goes so far in identifying where that line should 
be drawn.  
B.  Acknowledging the Power of Prosecutors 
Discretion in the criminal justice system does not disappear simply 
because judges are subject to greater control.  On the contrary, plac-
ing greater limits on judges has led to other actors gaining power.  
This is the story of sentencing reform:  as judges and parole officials 
have lost discretion, prosecutors have gained it.  Once again, the fed-
eral story offers the lesson through a negative example.  As Professor 
 
SENTENCING COMM’N PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT:  1ST QUARTER RELEASE 1 
tbl.1 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 QUARTERLY DATA REPORT], available at http:// 
www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quarterly_Sentencing_ 
Updates/USSC_2012_1st_Quarter_Report.pdf 
109 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. (2009); see 
also id. §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.3, 5H1.4, 5H1.11. 
110 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. (2011); see 
also id. §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.3, 5H1.4, 5H1.11. 
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Kate Stith has persuasively detailed, federal prosecutors have gained 
tremendous power since the Guidelines were adopted.111    
Prosecutorial influence goes far beyond just the plea power.  Fed-
eral prosecutors have enormous formal powers under the Guidelines 
through their ability to file substantial-assistance motions that lead to 
sentence reductions.112  Government-sponsored motions are the pri-
mary reason sentences are set below the Guidelines.  This occurs in 
roughly 26.4% of all cases.113  This dwarfs all other bases for downward 
departures, which together amount to 17.5% of all cases.114   
The Department of Justice often points to the Commission’s statis-
tics on sentences imposed within the Guideline range when expressing 
concern with the post-Booker disparities.115  In a recent speech, Assistant 
Attorney General Lanny Breuer noted that “since the Booker decision, 
judges have increasingly been sentencing defendants to prison sen-
tences outside the ranges prescribed by the guidelines.”116  As an ex-
ample, he pointed to the wide disparity between the Southern and 
Western Districts of Texas, where 71.5% of federal sentences in fiscal 
year 2010 fell within the Guidelines ranges, and the Southern District 
of New York, where only 32.6% did.117  “[M]ore and more,” Breuer 
said, “the length of a defendant’s sentence depends primarily on the 
identity of the judge assigned to the case, and the district in which he 
or she is in.”118  He went on to note the Commission’s finding that ra-
cial and ethnic sentencing disparities increased in the wake of Booker.119  
 
111 See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum:  Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 
117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1425 (2008) (arguing that the Guidelines “provided prosecutors with 
indecent power relative to both defendants and judges, in large part because of prosecu-
tors’ ability to threaten full application of the severe Sentencing Guidelines”). 
112 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1. 
113 2012 QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, supra note 108, at 1 tbl.1. 
114 Id. 
115 See, e.g., Holder Speech, supra note 43 (“The percentage of defendants sen-
tenced within the guidelines has decreased [since Booker].”). 
116 Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Speech at the American Lawyer/National 
Law Journal Summit (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/ 
speeches/2011/crm-speech-111115.html. 
117 Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET:  FIS-
CAL YEAR 2010 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 11 tbl. 8 (2010); U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET:  FISCAL YEAR 2010 WESTERN DISTRICT OF 
TEXAS 11 tbl. 8 (2010); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, STATISTICAL INFORMATION PACKET:  
FISCAL YEAR 2010 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 11 tbl. 8 (2010). 
118 Breuer, supra note 116. 
119 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SEN-
TENCING PRACTICES:  AN UPDATE OF THE BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION 
ANALYSIS 2 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Publications/ 
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However, government officials almost invariably overlook the fact that 
the vast majority of sentences outside the Guideline range are given at 
the government’s request—because of either the government’s fast-
track policy or a prosecutor’s substantial assistance motion, or for 
some other reason.   
It is therefore simplistic and potentially misleading to suggest there 
is a problem with judicial discretion based on departure rates without 
looking into the impetus for those departures.  For example, in the dis-
tricts compared by Lanny Breuer, government-sponsored motions 
produce the greatest disparity.120  In addition, districts cannot be mean-
ingfully compared without accounting for differences in the cases that 
arise in different geographic areas.  In the Southern and Western Dis-
tricts of Texas, roughly 75% of the federal docket consists of low-level 
immigration and marijuana smuggling—cases where the sentences are 
relatively low under the guidelines and therefore judges feel no need 
to depart.  The Southern District of New York, in contrast, has a large 
number of cases on the docket involving long guideline sentences for 
drug offenses because of the quantity involved that take little account 
of a defendant’s personal culpability.121   Prosecutors in these districts 
are therefore bringing different types of cases and filing different de-
parture motions at different rates. 
These statistics illustrate the breadth of prosecutorial discretion 
under the Guidelines.  Prosecutors have broad power to dictate sen-
tencing outcomes because they can determine how to charge an indi-
vidual without facing judicial review of that decision.122  Federal prose-
prosecutors are also the gatekeepers of key departure motions and 
therefore have additional power to determine whether an individual’s 
sentence should deviate from the Guidelines.  Substantial assistance 
motions are the most common reason for a defendant to receive a sen-
tence outside the Guidelines.  Moreover, on average, judges will de-
 
2010/20100311_Multivariate_Regression_Analysis_Report.pdf (“Black male offenders 
received longer sentences than white male offenders.  The differences in sentence 
length have increased steadily since Booker.”). 
120 Letter from David E. Patton, Exec. Dir., Fed. Defenders of N.Y., Inc., et al., to 
Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dept. of Justice 2 (Nov. 22, 2011), available 
at http://sentencing.typepad.com/files/letter-to-lanny-breuer-from-defenders.pdf. 
121 Id. at 2-3. 
122 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 66, at 85-92 (discussing presentencing 
techniques used by prosecutors that affect sentencing, such as charging decisions, plea 
bargaining, and fact bargaining); Stith, supra note 111, at 1430 (“[T]he prosecutor, 
through her discretionary charging authority, effectively determines what the defend-
ant’s Guidelines sentencing range will be.”).  
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part from the Guidelines to a “far greater” extent for substantial assis-
tance motions than they will for other reasons.123  Thus, whether a 
prosecutor views a defendant as sufficiently cooperative remains the 
number one basis by which a court distinguishes two defendants guilty 
of the same crime, and a favorable determination will more likely re-
sult in a greater departure from the Guidelines than any other reason.   
Yet neither Congress nor the Commission has established guide-
lines for how prosecutors should assess cooperation for the purposes 
of sentencing discounts.  In fact, all of the evidence suggests that dis-
tricts differ greatly as to how they evaluate this factor and how they 
discount sentences for defendants who have provided substantial assis-
tance to prosecutors.  Some evidence also suggests that these district-
level decisions may be influenced by race and gender—factors that 
should be irrelevant to the cooperation inquiry.124  The fast-track pro-
gram also differs by region,125 and it too is a common basis for distin-
guishing among otherwise similarly situated defendants. 
As long as guidelines apply only to judges, they will never resolve 
the disparity in the system and in fact may end up exacerbating the 
disparity by failing to provide a valuable check on prosecutors.  This 
 
123 See FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 66, at 102-03 (conducting an analysis of 
sentences imposed in 2001 and noting that “[t]he mean departure length for substan-
tial assistance was 43 months . . . while the mean departure length for other downward 
departures was just 20 months”). 
124 See LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE:  AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FED-
ERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 13-14 & exhibit 9 (1998), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Research/Research_Publications/Substantial_Assistance/199801_5K_Report.pdf (illus-
trating that nonminorities and women are more likely to receive substantial assistance 
motions than racial or ethnic minorities and men); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional De-
sign and the Policing of Prosecutors:  Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 
900 (2009) (discussing evidence that “personal characteristics” affect prosecutors’ deci-
sions about which defendants receive substantial assistance motions).  But see FIFTEEN 
YEAR REVIEW, supra note 66, at 105 (discussing a reevaluation of the Maxfield & Kramer 
data that calls into question their findings regarding the role of race and gender). 
125 Alison Siegler, Observations, Disparities and Discretion in Fast-Track Sentencing, 21 
FED. SENT’G REP. 299, 299-301 (2009) (describing both the regional disparities that 
result from fast-track sentencing and a circuit split over judges’ authority to reduce this 
disparity); Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen., on Department 
Policy on Early Disposition or “Fast-Track” Programs 2 (Jan. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/fast-track-program.pdf (“The existence of these programs 
in some, but not all, districts has generated a concern that defendants are being treated 
differently depending on where in the United States they are charged and sen-
tenced.”).  In January 2012, the Department of Justice started requiring all districts to 
offer fast-track programs and implemented “uniform, baseline eligibility requirements 
for any defendant who qualifies for fast-track treatment, regardless of where that de-
fendant is prosecuted.”  Id.  
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need for prosecutorial checks is another key lesson illustrating the lim-
itations of guidelines. 
C.  Respecting the Role of the Jury 
The Supreme Court has emphasized the jury’s central relationship 
to sentencing since its decision in Apprendi.126  However, its jurispru-
dence has thus far failed to address one of the starkest threats to the 
jury’s role:  sentencing guidelines that require judges to increase sen-
tences on the basis of conduct for which the defendant has been ac-
quitted.  Only the Federal Guidelines take this approach, and the 
Sentencing Commission implemented it without a directive from 
Congress.   
Congress has never specified—either in the Sentencing Reform 
Act or anywhere else—whether the Guidelines should follow a sen-
tencing model that uses “real” offenses or “charge” offenses.   A charge 
offense system bases the defendant’s punishment on the charges for 
which he was convicted.127  A real offense sentencing scheme looks to 
the defendant’s actual conduct and is not limited to conduct that the 
jury finds to be criminal.128  The original Sentencing Commission 
adopted a real offense sentencing model for the Guidelines.  Therefore, 
many factors, not just the charged offenses, determine an individual’s 
sentence.  Relevant conduct that was not charged—or even relevant 
conduct that forms the basis of a charge of which the defendant was 
acquitted—can determine the Guidelines base offense level and can 
increase the sentence through upward adjustments and departures.  In 
fact, in many cases relevant conduct can outweigh the charged offense 
in determining the defendant’s sentence.129    
For relevant conduct to have a bearing on the defendant’s sen-
tence, the prosecutor need only prove that conduct by a preponder-
 
126 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
127 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon 
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 9 (1988).  
128 Id. at 10 (noting that a real offense system “bases punishment on the elements 
of the specific circumstances of the case”). 
129 See Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An Empirical Study of the Application of the 
Relevant Conduct Guideline § 1B1.3, 10 FED. SENT’G REP. 16, 18 (1997) (relating the re-
sults of an empirical study on the vastly different sentencing ranges that can result from 
“relevant conduct” considerations); Jon M. Sands & Cynthia A. Coates, The Mikado’s 
Object:  The Tension Between Relevant Conduct and Acceptance of Responsibility in the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 61, 71-72 (1991) (describing the importance of 
relevant conduct in federal sentencing and finding that most courts have held that “any 
criminal conduct alleged should be factored into the sentence”).  
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ance of the evidence, even if a jury has already examined the evidence 
and acquitted the defendant of a charge based on that conduct.  If the 
prosecutor meets this burden, the Guidelines instruct judges to in-
crease the defendant’s sentence on that basis, regardless of what hap-
pened at trial.130  This instruction can substantially change a defendant’s 
case.  For example, the defendant in United States v. Manor was charged 
with one count of conspiracy to distribute 250 grams of cocaine and 
other distribution counts involving an additional 19 grams.131  The jury 
acquitted him on the conspiracy count but convicted him on the in-
tent to distribute 19 grams.132  The sentencing judge found that the 
conspiracy to distribute 250 grams was relevant conduct, a finding that 
tripled the defendant’s sentence exposure.133  The jury’s acquittal had 
no effect because the defendant faced the same punishment range as 
he would have had he been convicted of the conspiracy charge.  
Allowing sentencing courts to consider conduct for which the de-
fendant has been acquitted disregards the constitutional role of the 
jury.  Under our Constitution, it is the defendant’s right to have a jury 
definitively decide, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether or not he is 
guilty of a crime.  When the law instructs a judge to override a jury ac-
quittal based on the judge’s own findings, it undermines both the ef-
fort jurors put into evaluating cases and the defendant’s constitutional 
rights.  Thus, even before the Court’s Apprendi/Booker line of cases, 
judges and scholars criticized the Commission’s decision to use acquit-
ted conduct to set sentencing ranges.134     
In Booker, the Court found that the Guidelines’ mandate to use rele-
vant conduct in sentencing proceedings violated the Constitution’s 
 
130 See Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  A Struc-
tural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1325 (2005) (explaining how the relevant con-
duct inquiry requires judges to consider a defendant’s “uncharged, dismissed, and 
sometimes even acquitted conduct”).  See generally William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. 
Steer, Relevant Conduct:  The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 
495 (1990) (providing an overview of the rationale behind the relevant conduct rules 
and describing their practical application). 
131 936 F.2d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 1991). 
132 Id. 
133 See id. (explaining that the district court’s consideration of the conspiracy claim 
increased the defendant’s “base offense level from 12 to 20”). 
134 See Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury:  The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in 
an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 94 (2003) (discussing judges and 
commentators who have criticized the real offense sentencing scheme).   
Barkow FINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)5/15/2012 11:33 AM 
1628 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 1599 
Sixth Amendment jury guarantee.135  Thus, the Court ruled that judicial 
consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines would be advisory rather 
than mandatory.136  However, Booker did not eliminate the considera-
tion of acquitted conduct in determining defendants’ sentences.  
Thus, the Guidelines preserve the problem of acquitted conduct in-
creasing sentences.  Advising judges to increase a sentence on the basis 
of relevant conduct, even when a jury acquitted a defendant of that 
conduct, may no longer violate the Constitution in fact,137 but it stands 
in sharp tension with the jury’s constitutional role because judges con-
tinue to comply with the Guidelines,138 and the Guidelines continue to 
instruct judges to consider relevant conduct in sentencing.139   
Congress did not command this result, nor is there any evidence 
in the Sentencing Reform Act’s legislative history that suggests Con-
gress even intended this outcome.  Instructing judges to consider “real” 
conduct was a discretionary decision by one set of Commission mem-
bers who seemed to believe that Guidelines could and should occupy 
the entire field.140  
Other commissions have taken a more modest view of how far 
guidelines should sweep.  More than a third of all states now have 
some form of guidelines, most of which were passed after the federal 
guidelines.141   No state has followed the federal approach to real offense 
sentencing.  States have achieved all the same successes with guidelines 
as the federal system, but without substantially intruding on the jury’s 
function.  As in the federal system, states have been able to increase 
the predictability and uniformity of their sentencing through guide-
 
135 See 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (“[T]he provision of the federal sentencing statute 
that makes the Guidelines mandatory . . . [is] incompatible with today’s constitutional 
holding.”). 
136 Id. 
137 See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154 (1997) (“[W]e are convinced 
that a sentencing court may consider conduct of which a defendant has been acquit-
ted.”); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 406 (1995) (upholding the use of relevant 
conduct in determining a defendant’s sentence within the legislatively authorized pun-
ishment range). 
138 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. 
139 See, e.g., United States v. Waltower, 643 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2011) (uphold-
ing, once again, the constitutionality of considering acquitted conduct for sentencing 
and noting that every circuit to consider the question has ruled the same way).   
140 See Breyer, supra note 127, at 8 -12 (describing the decisionmaking process be-
hind the Commission’s choice of a modified “real offense” system). 
141 See Barkow & O’Neill, supra note 1, at 1994 tbl.1 (listing eighteen states that use 
sentencing guidelines and their dates of adoption).  Alabama joined the list when its 
sentencing guidelines went into effect in October 2006.  Act of Apr. 5, 2006, No. 2006-
312, § 2, 2006 Ala. Acts 663 (codified at ALA. CODE § 12-25-34.1 (2006)). 
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lines.  There is no evidence that any state’s failure to mandate the con-
sideration of a defendant’s acquitted conduct has led to increased 
crime rates.  Furthermore, many states have experienced decreases in 
their incarceration rates since they passed their guidelines.142   
The states’ experiences thus show that a real offense sentencing 
scheme is not necessary for maintaining low crime and incarceration 
rates.  The Commission’s rationale that broadly worded federal crim-
inal laws lack sufficient detail to form the basis for a charge offense 
system143 may support the use of uncharged conduct in general, but it 
fails to support the use of acquitted conduct to increase sentences.     
The Commission’s other rationale for adopting the modified real 
offense system also fails to excuse the Guidelines’ use of a defendant’s 
acquitted conduct.  The Commission justified this approach by argu-
ing that a real offense sentencing scheme would curb the ability of 
prosecutors to manipulate sentences through their decisions on charg-
ing and their power to hide facts relevant to the case.144  But that justi-
fication does not account for the Guidelines’ use of acquitted conduct 
because, in cases where acquitted conduct is relevant, prosecutors have 
brought the relevant charges out into the open already.   If anything, 
the ability to use acquitted conduct bolsters the power of prosecutors 
in this framework because it allows them to increase sentences after 
trials have taken place, using a lower standard of proof and without 
deferring to the rules of evidence.  The use of acquitted conduct also 
allows prosecutors to avoid the restrictions of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause by essentially giving them a second try at inflicting punishment 
for the same offense. 
Again, the lesson is that guidelines have limits and other actors 
must be considered.  In our constitutional system, the jury occupies a 
place of prominence, and guidelines should respect its role. 
 
142 See Barkow & O’Neill, supra note 1, at 2009 (explaining that “sentencing commis-
sions act to curb growth rates of incarceration”). 
143 See, e.g., FIFTEEN YEAR REVIEW, supra note 66, at 25 (“[T]he statute-defined ele-
ments of many federal crimes fail to provide sufficient detail about the manner in which 
the crime was committed to permit individualized sentences that reflect the varying 
seriousness of different violations.”).   
144 See id. (“[T]he Commission remained concerned that the charges to which de-
fendants were subject would continue to depend to some extent on which prosecutors 
were assigned to each case or in which district the offense was prosecuted, leading to 
unwarranted sentencing disparity.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The future of sentencing guidelines may depend on variables as 
diverse as the strength of the economy, appointments to the Supreme 
Court, and fluctuations in crime rates.  But if we have learned any-
thing from our experience thus far with guidelines, it is that the future 
will also continue to present to any sentencing authority the tension 
between expert assessments based on data and empirical facts, and 
political judgments based on popular will.  This Article seeks to make 
some modest suggestions for navigating that divide based on what we 
know so far.    
